Strong paraconsistency by separating composition and decomposition in classical logic by Verdée, Peter
Strong paraconsistency by separating
composition and decomposition in classical logic?
Peter Verde´e??
Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science
Ghent University, Belgium
Peter.Verdee@UGent.be
Abstract. In this paper I elaborate a proof system that is able to
prove all classical first order logic consequences of consistent premise
sets, without proving trivial consequences of inconsistent premises (as in
A,¬A ` B). Essentially this result is obtained by formally distinguish-
ing consequences that are the result of merely decomposing the premises
into their subformulas from consequences that may be the result of also
composing ‘new’, more complex formulas. I require that, whenever ‘new’
formulas are derived, they are to be preceded by a special +-symbol
and these +-preceded formulas are not to be decomposed. By doing
this, the proofs are separated into a decomposition phase followed by
a composition phase. The proofs are recursive, axiomatizable and, as
they do not trivialize inconsistent premise sets, they define a very strong
non-transitive paraconsistent logic, for which I also provide an adequate
semantics.
1 Introduction
Let a rule be a metalinguistic expression of the form “from A1, . . . ,An−1 and
An derive B, provided condition”. Instances of A1, . . .An will be called the lo-
cal premises of (an application of) the rule and an instance of B will be called
the conclusion of (an application of) the rule. In usual natural deduction proof
systems for classical logic, one is able to distinguish between what I shall call
compositional and decompositional rules. Compositional rules are rules of which
the conclusion nor its negation occurs as a subformula in the local premises.
Decompositional rules are rules that are not compositional. Examples of typi-
cal compositional rules include Addition (from ‘A’ derive ‘A ∨ B’), Adjunction
(from ‘A’ and ‘B’ derive ‘A∧B’), Existential Generalization (from ‘A(α)’ derive
‘∃βA(β)’, where β is a variable) and Introduction of the Identity (derive α = α).
Typical decompositional rules are Conjunction Elimination (from ‘A∧B’ derive
‘A’), Universal Instantiation (from ‘∀αA(α)’ derive ‘A(β)’), Modus Ponens (from
‘A ⊃ B’ and ‘A’ derive ‘B’) and Modus Tollens (from ‘A ⊃ B’ and ‘¬B’, derive
‘¬A’).
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How can we interpret such a distinction? It is clarifying to look at this dis-
tinction from a information-theoretical point of view. We could consider rules
as means to obtain more information from already derived information. Every
step of a prove governed by rules reveals or discovers more information from the
premises of the proof or from the laws of pure logic (in case of theorems)1. This
process of revealing information goes in two directions. Decompositional rules
reveal the information that is already fully present in the local premises. They
make this information available for further proof steps. Compositional rules on
the other hand somehow construct new information: they construct new (true)
strings by bringing new symbols into the proof (in the case of Addition) or by
combining already available strings and symbols into new more complex strings.
The compositional steps of interesting proofs create new information about the
premises, while the decompositional steps only analyze the premises. Compare
it to a toy house built with Lego blocks. The decompositional steps correspond
to the breaking down of the house into smaller parts, without doing anything
new. The compositional steps correspond to building up the smaller parts into
new creative houses or other constructions.
This distinction has an interesting computational aspect. One needs no goal
directed procedure to apply all possible decompositional rules to a (finite) set
of premises. This can be done in linear time, because the resulting formulas can
only become smaller. Of course this is not the case for the compositional rules.
One is, for example, able to apply the rule ‘from A derive A∧A’ infinitely many
times starting from one premise without ever obtaining the same formula. Hence,
in order to have any chance at ever finding an interesting result by applying
compositional rules, one needs a goal directed procedure, i.e. an algorithm that
determines which rules to apply in order to be able to derive interesting formulas
(goals).
My aim in this paper is threefold: first, I shall show that it is possible to
devise a proof system for classical first order logic (henceforth called CL) in
which one can properly distinguish the compositional from the decompositional
rules. This might seem evident, but remember that fitch style proofs for exam-
ple use conditional proofs. The status of the rule that allows one to derive an
implication from a conditional proof is obviously a compositional rule. However,
the conditional proof itself might also use decomposition, while the results of
decomposition steps in conditional proofs definitely are not decompositions of
the premises of the main proof. So, what would their status be? A usual ax-
iom system has another problem: all steps, apart from Modus Ponens and the
introduction of premises, are compositional (or decompositional, depending on
1 According to the traditional view on information, logical deduction cannot provide
new information. This position however is not anymore considered tenable by various
contemporary scholars (cf. [7] and [11]). A more epistemic perspective on the matter,
taking into account the fact that realistic agents do not have logical omniscience,
calls for a less extreme position. Here I look at information from an intuitive epis-
temic stance. A more formal elaboration of my stance on information in deductive
reasoning contexts is forthcoming.
whether one sees axioms as available information). Obviously this makes the
distinction rather useless. The proof system in this paper makes a clear distinc-
tion between compositional and decompositional steps. This distinction is even
present at the object level: compositional steps result in formulas preceded by
a special +-symbol. The logic C, which I shall present here will formalize this
proof system. The logic has a straight forward axiomatization and is therefore a
usual Tarski logic: compact, monotonic, reflexive and transitive.
Secondly, I want to show that, using this proof system, one only needs one
phase of decompositional steps followed by one phase of compositional steps in
order to obtain the full consistent fragment of classical logic. This is implemented
by requiring that, whenever ‘new’, composed formulas are derived, they are to
be preceded by a special +-symbol and these +-preceded formulas are not to
be decomposed. The decomposition phase, i.e. the phase in which formulas are
only decomposed and no +-preceded formulas are obtained, could be interpreted
as the analysis of the information present in the premises into the essential
parts needed for the decomposition phase, where one is able to derive new,
composed formulas. For the propositional level, the first phase more or less comes
to analyzing the premises into a normal form. However, at the predicative level
this is more complex.
Thirdly, and this is the main result, I want to show that one obtains a very
nice paraconsistent logic called CL− by separating composition and decomposi-
tion. This first order logic is paraconsistent, in the sense that inconsistent premise
sets do not lead to a trivial consequence set but the only thing one has to give
up by moving to this special paraconsistent logic is transitivity (sometimes also
called the ‘Cut’-rule, i.e. if Γ ` C for all C ∈ ∆ and Γ ∪∆ ` B then Γ ` B).
The logic is computationally not more complex than CL and has an elegant
proof system. Moveover, and most importantly, everything useful that is deriv-
able using CL, can also be derived using C. This logic defines a consequence
relation that is only weaker than the CL-consequence relation in the following
two aspects: (i) the trivial consequences of inconsistent premises are lost, but I
suppose nobody will see this as a disadvantage and (ii) the consequence relation
is no longer transitive. This last property might be considered as a disadvantage,
but is solved by the fact that the logic C itself is transitive. Although C defines
a weaker paraconsistent consequence relation than CL− in the usual CL lan-
guage, the logics C and CL− have essentially the same proof theory and every
reasoning process explicated by CL− can also be explicated by the logic C.
The results in this paper are strongly inspired by important work by Batens
and Provijn on so called goal directed or prospective proofs (cf. [1], [3], [4] and
[12]). The proofs they present are essentially procedural and goal dependent, i.e.
the correctness of a proof does not only depend on the premises of the proof but
also on the goal of the proof (the formula that is to be derived). The propositional
version of the logic CL− is an unexpected result of their goal directed proof
system. It is my aim to (i) generalize their results on CL− to the first order level
and (ii) to translate their proofs to usual non goal dependent, non procedural
proofs. This has the important advantage that one can accumulate and reuse
conclusions from a set of premises, i.e. old results obtained in proofs for some
goal A can be reused in proofs for a different goal B. This way I am able to
reintroduce transitivity. Although I give up goal dependence, I shall show that
my proofs can still very easily be turned into goal directed proofs, by adding
some heuristic restrictions to the rules of the logic.
The logic presented in this paper is also related to Besnard and Hunter’s
quasi-classical logic (cf. [5], [9], and [10]) and Craig’s Linear Reasoning (cf. [6]),
which is inspired by Gentzen’s famous cut-elimination theorem (cf. [8]). Both ap-
proaches separate compositional from decompositional steps in classical logic in
a very similar way (apart from some details, the distinction is identical to the one
I make). Craig, however, did not relate his results to paraconsistency, neither did
he give a semantics for his proof system. Besnard and Hunter’s fascinating QC
logic is quite similar to the logic CL− (apart from the fact that their consequence
relation (in general) does not validate CL-theorems), but lacks some of the at-
tractive properties of the here presented logic C, viz. (1) they do not present
an axiomatization, (2) they do not introduce a symbol (like the +-symbol) to
express the difference between decomposition and composition at object level,
(3) their proofs do not show the attractive relevant logic interpretation that I
shall explain in section 7, and (4) the semantic construction I shall present ex-
plicitly separates compositional and decomposition steps by means of gluts or
gaps for all formulas, whereas their semantics is only an adequate semantics for
the consequence relation Q (not for individual proof steps).
2 Language and proof theory
I start by presenting the formal languages that occur in this paper.
Let L be the language of CL with the logical symbols ¬, ⊃, ∃, and = (but
without function symbols); C is the set of (letters for) individual constants, V
the set of individual variables, S is the set of sentential letters, and Pr the set of
predicates of rank r ≥ 0—predicates of rank 0 will function as sentential letters.
The members of Pr will be P r, Qr, Rr, P r1 , . . .. Let F denote the set of (possibly
open) formulas of L and let W denote the set of closed formulas of L. Let ¬Pr
be the set of the members of Pr to which a ¬-symbol is added as a subscript,
i.e. the set {P r¬, Qr¬, Rr¬, P r1¬, . . .} and let ¬S be the set of the members of S to
which a ¬-symbol is added as a subscript, i.e. the set {p¬, q¬, r¬, p1¬, . . .}.
But the actual language of the logic C contains an extra +-symbol. Let L+
be exactly like L, apart from the fact that the unary symbol + is added to the
language. This symbol should only occur in front of formulas and should not be
nested. W+ = {+A | A ∈ W} ∪W. F+ is defined analogously.
P denotes the set of all members of W in which no logical symbols (not even
identity) occur and I = {α = β | α, β ∈ C}. P¬ = P ∪ {¬A | A ∈ P} and
P+ = P ∪ {+A | A ∈ P}. I+ and I¬ are defined analogously.
Let us now turn to the description of the proof system. In order to facilitate
this, I introduce the abbreviations ∗ and ‡: where A ∈ W, ∗¬A = A, ∗A = ¬A
if A is not of the form ¬B, ‡+A =df ∗A, and ‡A =df + ∗A.
Lines of proofs do not contain just one formula, but a finite set of formulas
between ~ and . I use the sloppy notation ~A1, . . . , An, ∆1, . . . ,∆k, B1, . . . , Bm,
where {A1, . . . , An} and {B1, . . . , Bn} are possibly empty, to denote the line{A1, . . . , An, B1, . . . , Bm} ∪∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆k. The intuitive meaning of such lines
is that at least one of the formulas in the set between ~ and  on a derived line is
derivable. But note that this interpretation is formally not entirely correct: the
lines are actually a lot stronger than this, and behave like contraposable relevant
conditionals, cf. section 7.
I start by presenting an axiomatic proof system with 9 axiom schemata and
3 rules2.
AS1 ~∗A,+A
AS2 ~+ ∗A,+A
AS3

A,B,+¬(A ∨B)
AS4
∗B,+(A ∨B)
AS5 ~+α = α
AS6
∗A(α),+∃xA(x)
AS7

+A(α),+ ∗A(β),+¬α = β
AS8 ~+¬α = β,+¬β = γ, α = γ
AS9 ~+¬α = β, β = α
PREM if A ∈ Γ , derive ~A
TRANS from ~A,∆1 and ~‡A,∆2 derive ~∆1 ∪∆2
UG if β ∈ C does not occur in ∆ ∪ Γ ∪ {A(α)}, from ∆,+A(β) derive
∆,+¬∃α ∗A(α)
Definition 1. A C-proof from a set of premises Γ is a list of lines of the form
~∆ where ∆ ⊂ W+ is finite and each line is an instance of one of the axiom
schemata AS1-9 or the result of an application of one of the rules TRANS,
PREM or UG.
Definition 2. Where Γ ∪ {A} ⊂ W+, Γ `C A iff there is a C-proof from
premises Γ in which ~A occurs on a line. Where Γ ∪∆ ⊂ W+, Γ `C ~∆ iff
there is a C-proof from premises Γ in which ~∆ occurs on a line.
This completes the definition of the proof system C. I now introduce a more
intuitive rule system called C2 (with many redundant, derivable rules). It in-
herits the 3 rules of C, but 15 rules are added.
R1 derive ~∗A,+A
R2 from ~A,∆ derive ~+A,∆
R3 from ~+ ∗A,+ ∗B,∆ derive +¬(A ∨B), ∆
R4 from ~A ∨B,∆ derive ~A,B,∆
R5 from ~+A,∆ derive

+(A ∨B), ∆
2 Concerning the rule UG: if all β ∈ C already occur in Γ , one may introduce dummy
constants in C-proofs, but the formulas that are the conclusions of the proof should
not contain these dummy constants
R6 from ~+B,∆ derive

+(A ∨B), ∆
R7 from
¬(A ∨B), ∆ derive ~∗A,∆
R8 from
¬(A ∨B), ∆ derive ~∗B,∆
R9 derive ~+α = α
R10 ~+¬α = β,+¬β = γ, α = γ
R11 ~+¬α = β, β = α
R12 from

+A(α), ∆

derive

+∃xA(x), ∆
R13 from
¬∃xA(x), ∆ derive ∗A(α), ∆
R14 from

A(α), ∆

and
∗A(β), ∆ derive ~+¬α = β,∆
R15 from ~α = β,∆ and

A(α), ∆

derive

+A(β), ∆

Definition 3. A C2-proof from a set of premises Γ is a list of lines of the form
~∆ where ∆ ⊂ W+ and each line is the result of an application of one of the
rules TRANS, PREM or UG or R1-R15.
Definition 4. Γ `C2 A iff there is a C-proof from premises Γ in which ~A
occurs on a line. Γ `C2 ~∆ iff there is a C-proof from premises Γ in which
~∆ occurs on a line.
The proof systems C and C2 lead to exactly the same consequence relation.
This is stated in the following theorem, which can easily be proved by showing
that all C-axioms can be derived using C2 rules and vice versa.
Theorem 1. Γ `C ~∆ iff Γ `C2 ~∆.
C2 has the advantage of yielding more natural proofs and explicitly showing
the difference between composition and decomposition, while C is metatheoret-
ically more elegant.
In both C and C2 one is able to define the other usual connectives in the
usual way, i.e. A ⊃ B =df ∗A ∨ B, A ∧ B =df ¬(∗A ∨ ∗B), A ≡ B =df (A ⊃
B) ∧ (B ⊃ A), and ∀αA(α) =df ¬∃α ∗ A(α). In the example proofs, I shall use
these defined symbols as abbreviations for their definientia.
Where L is a logic, W ′ is the language of L, and Γ ⊆ W ′, let CnL(Γ ) =df{A ∈ W ′ | Γ `L A}. The following theorem will be proved later (in section 7
as theorem 9), but C is a logic that is derived from CL and the C-proofs are
meant to prove CL-consequences, so this theorem is essential to understand the
function of C-proofs; it says that one can prove every CL-consequence of every
premise set Γ ⊂ W with a C-proof, as far as CnCL(Γ ) is not trivial3.
Theorem 2. If there is some C such that Γ 0CL C, then Γ `C +A iff Γ `CL A.
Although our proofs are strong enough to prove all useful CL-consequences,
they respect the requirements for the behavior of the +-symbol: (i) every time
a new, more complex formula is derived, it is preceded by a +-symbol (for
example {Pa} `C +∃xPx, `C +a = a, {Pa, Pb} `C +(Pa ∧ Pb) and {Pa ∨
3 Remark that this is not a weakness: if CnCL(Γ ) is trivial, proving CL-consequences
of Γ is quite useless anyway.
Pb} `C +(Pb ∨ Pa) but {Pa} 0C ∃xPx, 0C a = a, {Pa, Pb} 0C Pa ∧ Pb
and {Pa ∨ Pb} 0C Pb ∨ Pa) and on the other hand (ii) a formula which is
preceded by a +-symbol is never decomposed ({+∀x(Px ∧ Rx)} 0C +Pa and
{+(Pa ⊃ Pb), Pa} 0C Pb). The only case where the requirements for the +-
symbol are slightly loosened is the case of identity. In order to obtain an elegant
metatheory, I had to allow {a = b, b = c} `C a = c, {a = b} `C b = a and
{a = b} `C a = a, although, strictly speaking, the ideas from section 1 would
have required that these conclusions would only be allowed when preceded by a
+-symbol, as e.g. a = a or b = a or their negations are not subformulas of a = b.
Remark, however, that this is not a severe violation of the principles. Unlike in
the case of e.g. what is sometimes called the stuttering rule (A ` A∧A), which is
not valid in C, these identity transitivity and symmetry rules can never result in
infinitely many +-free consequences of finitely many premises. For example the
only +-free C-consequences of {a = b, b = c} are {a = a, a = b, a = c, b = a, b =
b, b = c, c = a, c = b, c = c}. As a consequence, these identity rules might also
be seen as rules that result in a special kind of decomposition steps, rather than
composition steps. Do not confuse this special case with normal identity cases,
e.g. {Pa, a = b} 0C Pb and {Pa} 0C a = a, as the normal cases are perfectly in
line with the requirements.
Finally, the attention of the reader should be pointed at the paraconsistency
of C, i.e. for every A ∈ W+, there is a B ∈ W+ such that A,¬A 0A B. One
can prove this by means of the paraconsistency of the semantics of C defined
in Section 4 plus the soundness of the proof theory of C with respect to its
semantics (cf. Section 5). However, to get a hint of how explosion is avoided,
observe that there is no immediate Ex Falso Quodlibet rule in C. Also, the
alternative way to derive explosion always involves composing a new formula
which is later decomposed (for example by applying Addition and Disjunctive
Syllogisme to an inconsistency: in case we have p and ¬p, simply apply p/p ∨ q
(Addition) and ¬p, p∨ q/q (Disjunctive Syllogism) — p∨ q as a newly composed
formula which is decomposed later). Precisely this is blocked in C whence this
blockage makes explosion impossible and the logic paraconsistent.
3 Examples
C-proof for a = b `C a = a
1 ~a = b PREM
2 ~+¬a = b,+¬b = a, a = a AS8
3 ~+¬b = a, a = a TRANS; 1,2
4 ~+¬a = b, b = a AS9
5 ~b = a TRANS; 1,4
6 ~a = a TRANS; 3,5
C2-proof for ∃x∀yPxy `C ∀y∃xPxy
1 ~∃x∀yPxy PREM
2 ~∀yPay,+ ∗ ∀yPay R1
3 ~Pab,+ ∗ ∀yPay R13; 2
4 ~+Pab,+ ∗ ∀yPay R2; 3
5 ~+∃xPxb,+ ∗ ∀yPay R12; 4
6 ~+∀y∃xPxy,+ ∗ ∀yPay UG; 5
7 ~+∀y∃xPxy,+ ∗ ∃x∀xPxy UG; 6
8 ~+∀y∃xPxy TRANS; 1,7
C2-proof for `C +∀x∃y(((Px ∧ ¬Rx) ∧ (¬Py ∨ ¬Ry)) ⊃ ¬x = y)
(in the following proof, let X abbreviate +(((Pa ∧ ¬Ra) ∧ (¬Pb ∨ ¬Rb)) ⊃ ¬a = b) )
1
¬(((Pa ∧ ¬Ra) ∧ (¬Pb ∨Rb)) ⊃ ¬a = b), X R1
2

(Pa ∧ ¬Ra) ∧ (¬Pb ∨Rb), X R7; 1
3 ~Pa ∧ ¬Ra,X R7; 2
4 ~Pa,X R7; 3
5 ~¬Ra,X R8; 3
6 ~¬Pb ∨Rb,X R8; 2
7 ~¬Pb,Rb,X R4; 6
8 ~¬a = b,Rb,X R10; 4,7
9 ~¬a = b,X R10; 5,8
10 ~a = b,X R8; 1
11 ~+a = b,X R2; 10
12 ~X TRANS; 9,11
13

+∃y(((Pa ∧ ¬Ra) ∧ (¬Py ∨ ¬Ry)) ⊃ ¬a = y) R12; 12
14

+∀x∃y(((Px ∧ ¬Rx) ∧ (¬Py ∨ ¬Ry)) ⊃ ¬x = y) UG; 11
C2-proof for ∀x(¬Px ∨ (Qx ∧Rx)), Pa `C +∃y(Qy ∨ Sy)
1
∀x(¬Px ∨ (Qx ∧Rx)) PREM
2
¬Pa ∨ (Qa ∧Ra) R13; 1
3 ~Pa PREM
4 ~¬Pa,Qa ∧Ra R4; 2
5 ~+¬Pa,Qa ∧Ra R2; 4
6 ~Qa ∧Ra TRANS; 5
7 ~Qa R7; 6
8 ~+Qa R2; 7
9

+(Qa ∨ Sa) R5; 8
10

+∃y(Qy ∨ Sy) R12; 9
4 Semantics
Because this proof system (although it is a proof system for (consistent) CL)
shows, thanks to its +-symbol and its paraconsistency, behavior that is quite
different from CL, it should not come as a surprise that one needs a completely
different semantics for C.
We shall use pseudo-constants to present the semantics as efficiently as pos-
sible. They do not occur in the actual object language (in premises, proofs or
conclusions) but only in the semantics. The set O is the set of pseudo-constants.
The language Lo is the language L enriched with these constants. The sets
Fo,Wo,Po, Io,F+o ,W+o ,P+o , I+o , P¬o , and I¬o are identical to the respective sets
without subscript o, except for the replacement of C by C ∪ O in their defini-
tions.
The semantics I am about to present is perfectly deterministic but has the
unusual property that the assignment assigns (unrelated) truth values to all
formulas (not only the primitive ones). This technical choice is made in order
to ensure that all formulas without a +-symbol show a logical gap (the normal
truth condition for the formula might be true, whilst the formula itself is false)
and all formulas with a +-symbol show a logical glut (the normal truth condition
for the formula might be false, whilst the formula itself is true). In this way we
obtain that our requirements about +-symbols are satisfied.
A C-model M is a triple 〈v, w,D〉, where D (the domain) is some set of
objects, w:W+o → {0, 1} is an assignment function which assigns a truth value
to every formula, without respecting the structure of the formula, and v is an
assignment function that has the following properties:
(i) v: C ∪ O → D (with D = {v(α) | α ∈ C ∪ O})
(ii) v:S ∪ ¬S → {0, 1}
(iii) v:Pr ∪ ¬Pr → ℘(D(r)) (for every r ≥ 1).
(iv) v: {¬ ·= ·, ·= ·,+¬ ·= ·} → ℘(D(2))
Let Iv(A), where v is an assignment function with the properties men-
tioned above and A is an atomic formula, be defined by ‘Iv(pi
rα1 . . . αr) =df
〈v(α1), . . . , v(αr)〉 ∈ v(pir)’, ‘Iv(¬pirα1 . . . αr) =df 〈v(α1), . . . , v(αr)〉 ∈ v(pir¬)’,
‘Iv(σ) =df v(σ) = 1’, ‘Iv(¬σ) =df v(σ¬) = 1’, ‘Iv(α = β) = 〈v(α), v(β)〉 ∈ v(·=
·)’, ‘Iv(¬α = β) = 〈v(α), v(β)〉 ∈ v(¬ ·= ·)’, and ‘Iv(+¬α = β) = 〈v(α), v(β)〉 ∈
v(+¬ ·= ·)’. Let TM (β), where M is a model 〈v, w,D〉 and β ∈ D, abbreviate
the semantic statement ‘either 〈β, β〉 ∈ v(¬ ·= ·) or there is a r-ary predicate pi
and α1, . . . , αr−1 ∈ D, such that 〈α1, . . . , αi, β, αi+1, . . . , αr−1〉 ∈ v(pir)∩v(pir¬)’.
Definition 5. The function ‡ which maps metalinguistic semantic expressions
to metalinguistic semantic expressions is recursively defined by means of the
following clauses (between quotation marks)—note that I write square brackets
to avoid confusion between function brackets and brackets in semantic expres-
sions: “‡[A or B] =df ‡A and ‡B”, “‡[A and B] =df ‡A or ‡B”, “‡[for all β ∈
C ∪O,A] =df there exists a β ∈ C ∪O such that ‡A”, “‡[there exists a β ∈ C ∪O
such that A] =df for all β ∈ C∪O, ‡A”, “‡[w(A) = 1] =df w(A) = 0 or w(‡A) =
1”, “‡[Iv(A)] =df not Iv(A) or Iv(¬A)” where A ∈ P, “‡[Iv(α = β)] =df not
Iv(α = β) or Iv(+¬α = β)”, “‡[not Iv(A) or Iv(¬A)] =df Iv(A)” where A ∈ P,
“‡[v(α) 6= v(β) or TM (v(α))] =df v(α) = v(β)”, “‡[v(α) = v(β)] =df v(α) 6=
v(β) or TM (v(α))” and finally “‡[vM (A) = i] =df vM (‡A) = i”, where i ∈ {0, 1}.
The valuation function vM :W+o → {0, 1}, where M = 〈v, w,D〉 is a C-model,
is defined by the following clauses.
S1 where A ∈ P, vM (A) = 1 iff w(A) = 1 and Iv(A)
S2 where A ∈ P, vM (¬A) = 1 iff w(¬A) = 1 and (not Iv(A) or Iv(¬A))
S3 vM (¬¬A) = 1 iff w(¬¬A) = 1 and vM (A) = 1
S4 vM (¬(A ∨B)) = 1 iff w(¬(A ∨B)) = 1 and vM (∗A) = 1 and vM (∗B) = 1
S5 vM (A ∨B) = 1 iff w(A ∨ B) = 1 and (vM (+ ∗ A) = 0 or vM (B) = 1) and
(vM (+ ∗B) = 0 or vM (A) = 1)
S6 vM (¬∃αA(α)) = 1 iff w(¬∃αA(α)) = 1 and for all β ∈ C∪O, vM (¬A(β)) =
1
S7 vM (∃αA(α)) = 1 iff w(∃αA(α)) = 1 and there exists a β ∈ C ∪ O,
such that vM (A(β)) = 1
S8 vM (¬α = β) = 1 iff w(¬α = β) = 1 and (v(α) 6= v(β) or TM (v(α)))
S9 vM (α = β) = 1 iff (Iv(α = β) or w(β = β) = 1) and v(α) = v(β)
S10 vM (+A) = 1 iff ‡[vM (∗A) = 1]
Clauses S2, S8 and S10 deserve a little extra attention. Clause S2 and S8
introduce another type of gluts than the ones introduced to fulfil the require-
ment for the +-symbol. This glut is a typical negation glut and ensures the
paraconsistency of the logic. Remark that the logic needs to be paraconsistent
as we obviously do not want to decompose formulas A and ¬A into an arbitrary
formula B. Clause S10 abbreviates all clauses for formulas of the form +A. They
are generated by ‡-transforming the clause for ∗A in line with Definition 5.
Given these criteria for being a C valuation function vM we can obtain the
following properties (for every A ∈ W+o and every C-model M) by a straight
forward mathematical induction on the complexity of A.
Lemma 1. 1. if vM (A) = 1 then vM (+A) = 1
2. vM (A) = 1 or vM (‡A) = 1
Finally we have all the means to determine when a C-model satisfies a for-
mula and to define semantic consequence.
Definition 6. Satisfaction.
Where A ∈ W+ and M is a C-model, M |= A iff vM (A) = 1.
Definition 7. Semantic C-consequence.
Where Γ ∪ {A} ⊂ W+, Γ C A iff M |= A for every model M such that
M |= B for all B ∈ Γ .
5 Soundness, completeness and other important
properties
We start by some important properties of the logic C. The next interesting
Lemma might be seen as an alternative for the usual deduction theorem. It is
proven in the Appendix of this paper.
Lemma 2. If ∆′ ⊂ ∆ and Γ ∪ {‡B|B ∈ ∆′} `C ∆−∆′, then there is a
Θ ⊂ {‡B|B ∈ ∆′} such that Γ ∪Θ `C ∆−∆′ or Γ `C ~∆
This lemma has some interesting corollaries.
Corollary 1. If Γ ∪A `C B then Γ `C B or Γ `C ~‡A,B.
Corollary 2. If Γ ∪A `C B then Γ `C B or Γ ∪ {‡B} `C ‡A.
Corollary 3. If Γ ∪ {A} `C B and Γ ∪∆ ∪ {‡A} `C B, then Γ ∪∆ `C B.
The next lemma immediately entails the soundness theorem for C.
Lemma 3. If Γ `C ~∆ then for all A ∈ ∆, Γ ∪ {‡B | B ∈ ∆− {A}} C A.
Proving Lemma 3 is just a matter of letting every line of every proof cor-
respond to its appropriate semantic C-consequence and proving that every C-
rule corresponds to a correct fact about semantic C-consequences. This is quite
straight forward except maybe for the fact that one should be aware of the fact
that ~A,A is identical to ~A. The semantic fact that correspond to this is that
Γ ∪ {‡A} C A iff Γ C A, which is warranted by Lemma 1.
Theorem 3. Soundness of C.
For every Γ ∪ {A} ⊆ W+, if Γ `C A then Γ C A
The following completeness theorem is proved in the appendix of this paper.
Theorem 4. Completeness of C.
For every Γ ∪ {A} ⊆ W+, if Γ C A then Γ `C A
Other important but easily provable properties of C are listed in the following
theorem.
Theorem 5. C is transitive, monotonic and reflexive. C-proofs are recursive
whence CnC is semi-recursive.
Finally, observe that C is paraconsistent, in view of the fact that every
premise set has a C-model; the model that makes all primitive formulas that
occur in the premises or of which the negation occurs in the premises true and
all other primitive formulas false. This model will satisfy the premises and falsify
at least one formula (on the condition that not all primitive formulas or their
negations occur in the premises—this condition is always true for premise sets
{A,¬A}).
Theorem 6. C is paraconsistent, i.e. for every A ∈ W, there is a B ∈ W+
such that A,¬A 0C B and also +A,+¬A 0C B.
6 A strong paraconsistent version of CL
We now return to the relation between C and CL. We start by defining an
extension of consistent CL (this is the logic that allows all the normal CL-
consequences of consistent premises and does not give any consequence for in-
consistent premise sets).
Definition 8. The logic CL−.
CL− uses the language L and where Γ ∪ {A} ∈ W, Γ `CL− A iff Γ `C +A
The propositional fragment of this logic is neatly characterized in [1] as the
logic Q. Proving that the propositional fragment of CL− is indeed equivalent to
this logic Q is quite straight forward but rather tedious.
I list the most important properties of CL− (most of them are easily provable,
except maybe the last one—for this property observe that A,¬A, (A∨B)∨¬(A∨
B) `C B, which is provable by means of a proof of which the essential lines are
A ∨B,¬(A ∨B), A,B,¬(A ∨B), and ~A,B,¬A).
Theorem 7. 1. CL− is paraconsistent.
2. CL− is not transitive.
3. CL− is monotonic and reflexive.
4. CL−-proofs are recursive whence `CL− is a semi-recursive relation (if the
set of premises is recursive).
5. CnCL−(Γ ∪ {¬A ∨A|A ∈ W}) = CnCL(Γ ).
The semi-recursiveness of `CL− is quite important and remarkable. As far as
my knowledge goes, there are no other existing paraconsistent logics that allow
all the CL-consequences of consistent premise sets AND have a positive test
whenever the set of premises is recursive. Most paraconsistent logics are weaker
than consistent CL (they invalidate CL-rules like Disjunctive Syllogism or Addi-
tion). Those that are not weaker than consistent CL are usually non-monotonic
(e.g. inconsistency adaptive logics, see [2], and consistent CL itself), which means
that some consequences are revoked when the premise set is enriched with in-
consistencies. Of course, this requires a full overview over the premises before
one can be certain that some formula is a consequence. Consequently, these log-
ics do not have a positive test (for infinite premise sets) whence they are not
semi-recursive.
In what follows (and in the proofs in the appendix) let ∃A, where A ∈ F ,
denote the existential closure of A and let Γ L A unionsq B denote that M |= A or
M |= B, for all L-models M such that M |= Γ
We now jump to the adequateness of CL− (and hence also of C) with respect
to CL. Proving soundness is straight forward: if every line ~∆ is transformed
into
∨
∆′, where ∆′ is ∆ without +-symbols, every transformation is evidently
a correct CL-consequence of the premises without +-symbols.
Theorem 8. If Γ `CL− A then Γ `CL A
Completeness however is less straight forward. We first need two lemma’s.
The first lemma is easily provable in view of Theorem 8 and the fact that
A,¬A `CL B.
Lemma 4. If Γ `C +∃(D ∧ ¬D) for some D ∈ F , then CnCL(Γ ) =W.
Lemma 5. If Γ C +A unionsq +B unionsq +C, then Γ C +A, Γ C +B, Γ C +C or
Γ,+ ∗A,+ ∗B C C.
Now we finally have all the means to prove the (consistent premises) com-
pleteness of C and CL− with respect to CL. Remark that this theorem is exactly
the same as Theorem 2. The proof of this theorem is in the appendix.
Theorem 9. If there is some C such that Γ 0CL C, then Γ `CL− A iff Γ `CL
A.
7 A relevant logic interpretation for the lines of C-proofs
The lines of C-proofs are easily interpretable as suggested by the soundness
theorem: a line ~∆ in a proof from premises Γ is interpreted as the expres-
sion “for all A ∈ ∆, Γ ∪ {‡B | B ∈ ∆ − {A}} `C A”. This interpretation
holds for all lines, but the rules of the proofs are not complete with respect
to this interpretation, i.e. it is not the case that “if for every A ∈ ∆ holds
Γ ∪ {‡B | B ∈ ∆ − {A}} `C A, then Γ ` ~∆. A simple counterexam-
ple for this is the fact that A ∨ B,C ∨ D 0C ~A,B,C,D, while obviously
{A∨B,C∨D,+¬A,+¬B,+¬C} `C D, {A∨B,C∨D,+¬A,+¬B,+¬D} `C C,
{A∨B,C∨D,+¬A,+¬C,+¬D} `C B, and {A∨B,C∨D,+¬B,+¬C,+¬D} `C
A.
Actually, these lines of C-proof are in fact relevant contraposable implications
in disguise, where a line ~A,B,C,D, for example, would, in a usual relevant
logic like the logic R, be written as ∗A→ (∗B → (∗C → D)). The reason why the
simple interpretation explained above is not adequate is precisely this relevant
character of the lines. In particular, the problem is related to the fact that our
proofs do not allow for weakening. This property/rule is usually expressed as
A→ (B → A) and is not valid in relevant logics (if A is true anyhow, (the truth
of) B is irrelevant for the truth of A). In the case of C-proofs weakening comes
to deriving ~C,D from ~C, which is evidently impossible. Another relevantly
invalid property is A → (B → (¬A → B)). For our lines this comes to deriving
~A,B from lines ~A and ~B, which is also not allowed. On the other hand all
relevantly unproblematic consequences are allowed in C-proofs (modus ponens,
transitivity, contraction, contraposition).
The following interpretation for lines of C-proofs is adequate with respect to
C-proofs.
Definition 9. Where Γ,∆ ⊂ W+, Γ C ~∆ iff 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ X, where X is the
smallest set that satisfies the two following criteria
1. 〈Γ, {A}〉 ∈ X if Γ C A,
2. 〈Γ ∪ {A}, ∆〉 ∈ X if 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ X,
3. 〈Γ ∪ Γ ′, ∆〉 if Γ C A and 〈Γ ′ ∪ {A}, ~∆〉, and
4. 〈Γ,∆〉 if, for every ∆′ ⊂ ∆, 〈Γ ∪ {‡B|B ∈ ∆′}, ∆−∆′〉 ∈ X and, for every
Θ ⊂ {‡B|B ∈ ∆′}, 〈Γ ∪Θ,∆−∆′〉 /∈ X.
Theorem 10. For every Γ ∪∆ ⊆ W+, Γ `C ~∆ iff Γ C ~∆.
Although this interpretation is not deterministic, it is quite interesting as it
seems to be an elegant means to define the semantics of quite a rich relevant
implication without reference to worlds and accessibility relations.
I shall now make the relation between C and relevant conditionals precise.
Let W→ be the set of formulas defined by W ⊂ W→ and A → B ∈ W→ iff
A,B ∈ W→. We need to define a translation function tr before we can proceed
to defining relevant theoremhood based on the lines of C-proofs.
1. where n > 0, B ∈ W and A1, . . . An ∈ W→,
tr(A1 → (A2 → (A3 → . . . (An → B) . . .))) =‡tr′(A1), ‡tr′(A2), ‡tr′(A3), . . . , ‡tr′(An),+B
2. where A ∈ W, tr(A) = +A and tr′(A) = A
3. where A1, A2 ∈ W→ tr′(A1 → A2) = ¬tr′(A1) ∨ tr′(A2)
Definition 10. Let the logic `Cr be defined by:
• the set of formulas of Cr is W→,
• where A ∈ W→, `Cr A iff `C tr(A), and
• only theoremhood of Cr is defined, no consequence relation.
It is easy to check that: (in the right column the corresponding translation
to a C-theorem is mentioned)
0Cr B → (A→ B) 0C ~+ ∗B,+ ∗A,+B
0Cr A→ (B → B) 0C ~+ ∗A,+ ∗B,+B
0Cr A→ (¬B ∨B) 0C + ∗A,+(¬B ∨B)
0Cr B → (¬B → A) 0C ~+ ∗B,+B,+A
0Cr B → (A→ (¬B → A) 0C ~+ ∗B,+ ∗A,+B,+A
`Cr A→ A `C ~+ ∗A,+A
`Cr A→ (A ∨B) `C + ∗A,+(A ∨B)
`Cr (A ∧B)→ A `C + ∗ (A ∧B),+A
`Cr A→ (B → (A ∧B)) `C + ∗A,+ ∗B,+(A ∧B)
where A ∈ W is a CL-theorem, `Cr A `C ~+A
`Cr (A→ B)→ ((B → C)→ (A→ C)) `C + ∗ (∗A ∨B),+ ∗ (∗B ∨ C),+ ∗A,+C
`Cr (A→ (B → C))→ (B → (A→ C)) `C + ∗ (∗A ∨ (∗B ∨ C)),+ ∗B,+ ∗A,+C
It is still unclear whether Cr is a fully relevant logic, but the above properties
are quite promising. All straight forward irrelevances of CL (paradoxes of mate-
rial implication) are eliminated for the →-implication, while at the same time it
is crystal clear that → is a fairly strong conditional (all axioms of the standard
relevant logic R are valid). Although it seems likely that Cr is a useful relevant
logic, it has an elegant proof theory which has an adequate semantics that does
not refer to worlds or accessibility relations. This is a rather remarkable result.
Remark that this conditional has some unusual properties. For example, Dis-
junctive Syllogism is valid (i.e. `Cr (A∨B)→ (¬A→ B)), and so are Addition
(i.e. `Cr A → (A ∨ B)), Transitivity (i.e. `Cr (A → B) → ((B → C) → (A →
C))), and Modus Ponens (i.e. `Cr A → ((A → B) → B)). From the validity of
these rules, one would expect that Ex Falso Quodlibet (i.e. A → (¬A → B)) is
also validated in Cr, but this is NOT the case. This is possible due to the fact
that the metatheoretic version of Modus Ponens (from ` A and ` A→ B, derive
` B) is NOT valid in Cr.
8 Procedures for proof generation
In the first section, I mentioned that the ideas for the logic C are inspired by the
goal directed proof system defined by Batens and Provijn. The main objective of
those goal directed proofs is to push the heuristics a reasoner uses to construct
a proof for a given formula into the proof itself. The goal directed proofs do not
allow useless (but essentially correct) proof steps. For example, if one wants to
derive q from p and p ⊃ q, deriving p∨ r will (although evidently correct in CL)
never be considered as a wise step in a proof. Goal directed proofs give a formal
criterion to distinguish between potentially useful and useless steps in a proof
with a certain goal. Evidently, these goal directed proofs, in which one avoids
useless steps, can easily be turned into algorithms that construct proofs. Hence,
they also form (partial) decision methods for logical consequence.
My aim was precisely to eliminate the goal dependency from the goal di-
rected proofs (and thereby making transitive reasoning and a usual semantics
and axiomatization for CL− possible). So I had to lose part of the advantage and
the original aim of the goal directed proofs. However, the goal directed element
can easily be added on top of the C1-proofs. Making C1-proofs as elegant and
insightful as the original goal directed proofs is just a matter of adding some mi-
nor heuristic information to the proofs; the logical rules do not need to change.
Such an enterprise, however, is not substantial for my present purpose.
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Appendix: metaproofs
Sketch of the proof of Lemma 2
Suppose ∆′ ⊂ ∆, Γ ∪ {‡B|B ∈ ∆′} `C ∆−∆′ and for all Θ ⊂ {‡B|B ∈ ∆′},
Γ ∪ Θ 0C ∆−∆′. Hence there is a proof in which ∆−∆′ is derived and
every ~‡B, where B ∈ ∆′, is used as a local premise in the derivation tree of
∆−∆′. Now it is possible to replace every such ~‡B by ~‡B,B (remember
that this is an axiom). The rest of the proof can remain the same, apart from the
fact that for every line which is in the derivation tree on a branch that contains
a line ~‡B, where B ∈ ∆′, B should be added as an element of that line. The
result will be that the line

∆−∆′ is transformed into ~∆ whence the proof
for Γ ∪ {‡B|B ∈ ∆′} `C ∆−∆′ is transformed into a proof for Γ `C ~∆.
Sketch of the proof of Theorem 4
Let Lp be exactly as Lo except for the replacement of O by O′, which is an
arbitrary, countably infinite subset of O. Wp, Pp, L+p , W+p , and P+p are defined
analogously. Let Dp =df {~∆ |∆ ⊂ W+p }.
Let a C∗-proof from Γ ∈ W+p ∪ Dp be a list of lines such that every line
is either a line in a C-proof from Γ ∩ W+p , an element of Γ ∩ Dp or a result
of applying the rules TRANS, or UG to preceding lines of the proof. Where
Γ ∪ {A} ∈ W+p ∪ Do, define `C∗ by Γ `C∗ A iff there is a C∗-proof for A from
Γ . Obviously, with this definition, for every Γ ∪{A} ⊆ Wp, Γ `C A iff Γ `C∗ A,
but remark that e.g. ~Pa `C∗ +¬∃xPx, whereas evidently Pa 0C +¬∃x¬Px
and Pa 0C∗ +¬∃x¬Px.
Suppose Γ 0C A, where Γ ∪A ⊆ W+, whence Γ 0C∗ A. Let 〈B1, B2, . . .〉 be
an enumeration of all elements of W+p ∪ {~A,C | C ∈ W+p } such that if Bi =
∃βC(β) then Bi+1 = C(α) and if Bi = A,∃βC(β) then Bi+1 = A,C(α) ,
where α ∈ O′ does not occur in {B1, . . . , Bi}. Define:
∆0 = CnC(Γ ){
∆i+1 = CnC∗(∆i ∪ {Bi+1}) if A /∈ CnC∗(∆i ∪ {Bi+1})
∆i+1 = ∆i otherwise
∆ = ∆0 ∪∆1 ∪ . . .
We show that ∆ has the following properties:
1. Γ ⊆ ∆. Immediately.
2. A /∈ ∆. Immediately.
3. ∆ is deductively closed. Immediately.
4. ∆ is ω-complete i.e. if ∃αA(α) ∈ ∆ then A(β) ∈ ∆ for at least one β ∈ C∪O.
Suppose ∃αA(α) ∈ ∆, Bi = ∃αA(α) and there is no β ∈ C ∪ O such that
A(β) ∈ ∆. But then also ∆i ∪ {Bi+1} `C A, with Bi+1 = A(β) for some
β ∈ O that does not occur in ∆i. Hence, in view of Lemma 2, ∆i `C A or
∆i `C + ∗A(β), A. The former disjunct is impossible in view of property
2 and the latter disjunct entails ∆i `C +¬∃αA(α), A (β does not occur
in ∆i ∪ {A}), whence ∆i ` ~A (by ∆i `C ∃αA(α) and TRANS), which
is also impossible in view of property 2.
5. ∆ is ω∗-complete i.e. if A,∃αC(α) ∈ ∆ then A,C(β) ∈ ∆ for at least
one β ∈ C ∪ O. Suppose A,∃αC(α) ∈ ∆, Bi = ∃αC(α) and there is no
β ∈ C ∪ O such that C(β) ∈ ∆. But then also ∆i ∪ {Bi+1} `C∗ A, with
Bi+1 =

A,C(β)

for some β ∈ O that does not occur in ∆i. Hence, in view
of ∆i 0C∗ A, ∆i ∪ C(β) `C∗ A and therefore ∆i ∪ ∃αA(α), A `C A
(consider a proof that contains a line j saying

A,∃αC(α). We can add a
line

C(β),+ ∗ C(β). Because ∆i ∪ C(β) `C∗ A, we can add a number
of lines resulting in

A,+ ∗ C(β) and therefore also A,+¬∃αC(α) can
be added, which with line j allows us to conclude ~A.) This would entail
∆ ∪ ∃αA(α), A `C∗ A and hence also ∆ `C∗ A, which is impossible in
view of property 2.
6. For every C ∈ W+o holds that if C /∈ ∆, then ‡C ∈ ∆. Suppose C /∈ ∆ and
‡C /∈ ∆. Then there are i, j ∈ N such that ∆i∪{C} `C A and ∆j ∪{‡C} `C
A. But then, by Corollary 3, also ∆i ∪∆j `C A, which is impossible in view
of property 2.
Where α ∈ C ∪ O′, let α = {α} ∪ {β | α = β ∈ ∆}. Observe that the set
{α|α ∈ C ∪ O′} is a partition of the set C ∪ O′.
Define M as the triple 〈v, w,D〉, where D = {α | α ∈ C ∪O}, v is defined by:
1. for every α ∈ C ∪ O: v(α) = α,
2. v(σ) = 1 iff σ ∈ ∆,
3. v(σ¬) = 1 iff ¬σ ∈ ∆,
4. for every pir ∈ Pr: v(pir) = {〈v(α1), . . . , v(αr)〉 | piα1 . . . αr ∈ ∆},
5. for every pir ∈ Pr: v(pir¬) = {〈v(α1), . . . , v(αr)〉 | ¬piα1 . . . αr ∈ ∆},
6. v(¬ ·= ·) = {〈v(α), v(β)〉 | ¬α = β ∈ ∆},
7. v(+¬ ·= ·) = {〈v(α), v(β)〉 | +¬α = β ∈ ∆}, and
8. v(·= ·) = {〈v(α), v(β)〉 | α = β ∈ ∆}
and w :W+o 7→ {0, 1} is defined by
1. for every B ∈ Wo: w(B) = 1 iff B ∈ ∆, and
2. for every B ∈ Wo: w(+B) = 1 iff +B ∈ ∆.
Note that, for all B ∈ P¬o ∪ {A | α, β ∈ C ∪ O;A = α = β or A = +¬α = β
or A = +¬α = β},
Iv(B) iff B ∈ ∆ . (1)
For all B ∈ Wo, if vM (B) = 1 then (w(B) = 1 or Iv(B)) and therefore
B ∈ ∆. We obtain,
if B ∈ Wo and vM (B) = 1 then B ∈ ∆ . (2)
For all B ∈ Wo, if B ∈ ∆ then w(B) = 1 and, when B is of the form ¬α = β,
Iv(B). Consequently, B ∈ ∆. We obtain,
if B ∈ Wo and +B ∈ ∆ then vM (+B) = 1 . (3)
We shall prove that, for all B ∈ W+o ,
vM (B) = 1 iff B ∈ ∆ . (4)
by means of an induction on the complexity of B (the complexity of B is com-
puted by counting all occurrences of ¬¬, ∨ and ∃). Note that I omit all statements
that immediately follow from (2) or (3).
For the induction basis, we have the following cases.
• B ∈ P. If B ∈ ∆ then w(B) = 1 (5) and by (1), Iv(B) (6). (5) and (6)
together entail vM (B) = 1.
• B = ¬C and C ∈ P. If ¬C ∈ ∆ then w(¬C) (7) and, by (1), Iv(¬C) (8). (7)
and (8) together entail vM (¬C) = 1.
• B = α = β. If α = β ∈ ∆ then v(α) = α = β = v(β) (9). If α = β ∈ ∆ then,
by (1), Iv(α = β) (10). (9) and (10) together entail vM (α = β) = 1.
• B = ¬α = β. If ¬α = β ∈ ∆ then w(¬α = β) = 1 (11) and, by (1),
Iv(¬α = β) (12). If v(α) = v(β) then, by (12), Iv(¬α = α) whence TM (v(α))
holds. (11) and (v(α) 6= v(β) or TM (v(α))) together entail vM (¬α = β) = 1.
• B = +C and C ∈ P. If ‡[vM (¬C) = 1] then w(¬C) = 0 or w(+C) = 1
or Iv(C). If w(¬C) = 0 then ¬C /∈ ∆ whence, by property 6, +C ∈ ∆.
If w(+C) = 1 then +C ∈ ∆. If Iv(C) then, by (1), C ∈ ∆ whence, by
C `C +C, +C ∈ ∆.
• B = +¬C and C ∈ P. If ‡[vM (C) = 1] then w(C) = 0 or w(+¬C) = 1
or not Iv(C) or Iv(¬C). If w(C) = 0 then C /∈ ∆ whence, by property 6,
+¬C ∈ ∆. If w(+¬C) = 1 then +¬C ∈ ∆. If Iv(¬C) then, by (1), ¬C ∈ ∆
and, by ¬C `C +¬C, also +¬C ∈ ∆. Finally, if not Iv(C) then, by (1),
C /∈ ∆ whence, by property 6, +¬C ∈ ∆.
• B = +α = β. If ‡[vM (¬α = β) = 1] then w(¬α = β) = 0 or w(+α = β) = 1
or v(α) = v(β). If w(¬α = β) = 0 then ¬α = β /∈ ∆ whence, by property 6,
+α = β ∈ ∆. If w(+α = β) = 1 then +α = β ∈ ∆. Finally, if v(α) = v(β)
then also α = β ∈ ∆ or α = β. In both cases +α = β ∈ ∆.
• B = +¬α = β. If ‡[vM (α = β) = 1] then not Iv(α = β) or Iv(+¬α = β)
or v(α) 6= v(β) or TM (v(α)). If not Iv(α = β) then α = β /∈ ∆ whence, by
property 6, +¬α = β ∈ ∆. If Iv(+¬α = β) then, by (1) +α = β ∈ ∆. Either
v(α) 6= v(β) or v(α) = v(β). If v(α) 6= v(β) then α = β /∈ ∆ whence, by
property 6, +¬α = β ∈ ∆. Suppose now v(α) = v(β) and TM (v(α)). Then
either Iv(¬α = α) and therefore Iv(¬α = β) whence, by 1, ¬α = β ∈ ∆ and
thus +¬α = β ∈ ∆, or there is an r-ary predicate pi and α1, . . . , αr−1 ∈ D,
such that 〈α1, . . . , αi, v(α), αi+1, . . . , αr−1〉 ∈ v(pi)∩v(pi¬))’. Hence there is a
C(α) ∈ Po such that Iv(C(α)) and Iv(¬C(α)), and therefore, by v(α) = v(β),
also Iv(¬C(β)) and, by (1), {C(α),¬C(β)} ⊂ ∆. This entails +¬α = β ∈ ∆
(AS7).
For the induction step, suppose vM (C) = 1 iff C ∈ ∆, for every C of
complexity lower than c. We prove that vM (B) = 1 iff B ∈ ∆ for every B of
complexity c.
Given (2) and (3), we only need to prove that if B ∈ ∆ then vM (B) = 1
where B ∈ Wo and if ‡[vM (‡B) = 1] then B ∈ ∆ where B = +C and C ∈ Wo.
• B = D∨E. Immediately in view of D∨E,+∗D `C E and D∨E,+∗E `C D.
• B = ¬(D∨E). Immediately in view of ¬(D∨E) `C ∗D and ¬(D∨E) `C ∗E.
• B = ∃αD(α). Immediately in view of the ω-completeness of ∆.
• B = ¬∃αD(α). Immediately in view of ¬∃αD(α) `C ∗D(β) for all β ∈ C∪O.
• B = +(D ∨ E). Immediately in view of +D `C +(D ∨ E) and +E `C
+(D ∨ E).
• B = +¬(D ∨ E). Immediately in view of +D,+E `C +(D ∧ E).
• B = ¬¬D. Immediately in view of ¬¬D `C D.
• B = +¬¬D. Immediately in view of +D `C +¬¬D.
• B = +∃αD(α). Immediately in view of D(β) `C ∃αD(α) for all β ∈ C ∪ O.
• B = +¬∃αD(α). Suppose ‡[vM (‡B) = 1] and thus w(∃αD(α)) = 0 or
w(+¬∃αD(α)) = 1 or for all β ∈ C ∪ O, vM (+ ∗ D(β)) = 1. The two first
cases are obvious. In the last case, by the induction hypothesis, +∗D(β) ∈ ∆
for all β ∈ C∪O (13). Suppose +¬∃αD(α) /∈ ∆ . Hence there is an i such that
∆i ∪ {+¬∃αD(α)} `C A whence, in view of Lemma 2, ∆i `C A,∃αD(α)
and therefore

A,∃αD(α) ∈ ∆. In view of the ω∗-completeness of ∆ there
exists a γ such that

A,D(γ)
 ∈ ∆. As a consequence there is a, ∆i ∪ {+ ∗
D(γ)} `C A whence + ∗D(γ) /∈ ∆, which contradicts (13).
By (4) and properties 1 and 2, we obtain Γ 2C A.
Sketch of the proof of Theorem 9
Suppose
Γ 0C +A (14)
where Γ ∪+A ⊆ W+ and
there is some C such that Γ 0CL C . (15)
The latter supposition entails
Γ 0C +∃(D ∧ ¬D) for every D ∈ Wp , (16)
in view of Lemma 4.
Let L = 〈B1, B2, . . .〉 be an infinite list of all members ofWp (for the definition
of Wp, see the previous proof) such that if Bi = ∃βC(β) then Bi+1 = C(α),
where α ∈ O′ does not ocuur in ∆i.
∆1 = CnC(Γ ) (17)
∆i+1 =

CnC(∆i ∪ {Bi+1}) if ∆i ∪ {Bi+1} 0C +A and there is
no C ∈ Wp such that
∆i ∪ {Bi+1} `C +∃(C ∧ ¬C)
CnC(∆i ∪ {‡Bi+1}) otherwise
(18)
∆ = ∆1 ∪∆2 ∪ . . . (19)
We prove by means of mathematical induction that, for every i > 1,
+A /∈ ∆i and there is no D ∈ F such that + ∃(D ∧ ¬D) ∈ ∆i . (20)
For the basic case, +A /∈ ∆1 (from supposition (14)) and there is no D ∈ Wp
such that +∃(D ∧ ¬D) ∈ ∆1 (from (16)).
For the induction step we need to prove that if “+A /∈ ∆i and there is no
D ∈ Wp such that +∃(D∧¬D) ∈ ∆i”, then “+A /∈ ∆i+1 and there is no D ∈ Wp
such that +∃(D ∧ ¬D) ∈ ∆i+1”. Suppose that the antecedent holds. There are
two cases.
Case 1: (i) ∆i ∪ {Bi+1} 0C +A and (ii) there is no C ∈ Fp such that ∆i ∪
{Bi+1} `C +∃(C∧¬C). In this case ∆i+1 = CnC(∆i∪{Bi+1}) whence
+A /∈ ∆i+1 (from (i)) and there is no D ∈ Wp such that +∃(D∧¬D) ∈
∆i+1 (from (ii)).
Case 2: ∆i ∪ {Bi+1} `C +A or there is a C ∈ F such that ∆i ∪ {Bi+1} `C
+∃(C ∧ ¬C). In this case ∆i+1 = CnC(∆i ∪ {‡Bi+1}) and there is a
C ∈ F such that
∆i ∪ {Bi+1} C +A unionsq+∃(C ∧ ¬C) . (21)
Suppose now +A ∈ ∆i+1 or there is a D ∈ Wp such that +D ∈ ∆i+1
and +¬D ∈ ∆i+1. But then there would also be a D ∈ Wp, such that
(by +A `C +(A ∨ ∃(D ∧ ¬D)) and +D,+¬D `C +(A ∨ ∃(D ∧ ¬D)))
∆i ∪ {‡Bi+1} C +A unionsq+∃(D ∧ ¬D) . (22)
From (21) and (22), Corollary 3 warrants that
∆i C +A unionsq+∃(D ∧ ¬D) unionsq+∃(C ∧ ¬C) . (23)
This entails (by Lemma 5)
∆i C +A or ∆i C +∃(D ∧ ¬D) or
∆i C +∃(C ∧ ¬C) or
∆i ∪ {+¬∃(C ∧ ¬C),+¬∃(D ∧ ¬D)} C A .
(24)
As `C is complete with respect to its semantics and as +¬∃(E∧¬E) ∈
∆i for every E ∈ F (the reader can check that C +¬∃(E∧¬E) ∈ ∆i),
this is in contradiction with the induction hypothesis. Consequently,
+A /∈ ∆i+1 and there is no D ∈ F such that +∃(D ∧ ¬D) ∈ ∆i+1.
Now we have
A /∈ ∆ , (25)
there is no D ∈ Wp such that +D,+¬D ∈ ∆ , (26)
(otherwise there would be an i such that +∃(D ∧ ¬D) ∈ ∆i)) and
for every D ∈ Wp, D ∈ ∆ or ‡D ∈ ∆ . (27)
(26) and (27) together entail
for every D ∈ Wp, if +D ∈ ∆ then ‡D ∈ ∆ . (28)
Consequently (remember that `C +(D ∨ ¬D)) D ∨ ¬D ∈ ∆, for every D ∈ ∆,
whence, by Theorem 7 item 5 and the fact that ∆ is C-deductively closed,
CnCL(∆ ∩Wp) = ∆ ∩Wp . (29)
Using (25-29) one can show by means of the usual methods that ∆ ∩ Wp is a
CL-model set (i.e. it is maximally non-trivial, CL-deductively closed and ω-
complete). Hence there exists a CL-model such that, for all A ∈ W, M |= A iff
A ∈ ∆. In view of (25), we finally obtain
Γ 0CL A .
